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I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Burkholder,I a case of first impression, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the exclusionary rule 2 was applicable in probation revocation proceedings. The
court's holding relied on both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion 3 and section 14, article I of the Ohio Constitution.4 While not completely
unprecedented, Burkholder is in opposition to the majority view5 on the extent of
federal constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is
no doubt, however, that Ohio could rely on its own constitution to expand the
application of the state's exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings. 6
If the Ohio Supreme Court did rely independently on the state constitution, then
review by the United States Supreme Court would be precluded;7 thus, the
exclusionary rule would still apply in Ohio even if the United States Supreme Court
eventually decides that the fourth amendment does not require such protection. There
remains some doubt, however, as to whether Burkholder is in fact based solely on the
Ohio Constitution.3 Furthermore, it remains unclear whether the Ohio Supreme Court
intended to expand a probationer's state constitutional rights beyond those guaranteed
by the fourth amendment. 9 Unfortunately, Burkholder raises more questions than it
answers.
This Comment analyzes the Burkholder decision and its many unanswered
questions. Section II addresses the exclusionary rule and its applicability in
Burkholder under both federal and state constitutional guarantees. The recent trend
toward reliance on state constitutions to expand individual liberties10 is the subject of
section III. Section IV focuses on the Ohio Supreme Court's reliance on the state
constitution and specifically considers Burkholder's reference to the state constitu-
tion. Finally, section V recognizes the unanswered questions raised by this case and
suggests that the Ohio Supreme Court may be signaling a new approach that would
provide greater protection for individual liberties under the Ohio Constitution.
1. 12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 466 N.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
2. In general, the exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized in an unreasonable search and seizure is
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. See also infra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. Com.sr. amend. IV.
4. OMo Co Nsr. art. I, § 14.
5. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. For purposes of this Comment, the term "individual liberties" encompasses both civil rights and defendants'
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II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS APPLICATION IN Burkholder
A. Federal and State Exclusionary Rules
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons within
the United States from unreasonable searches and seizures, and guarantees that search
warrants shall lawfully issue only if based on probable cause." To enforce this
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court held in
Weeks v. United States12 that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment
was inadmissible in a federal prosecution. 13 The function of this exclusionary rule "is
to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.14 After the Supreme
Court held that the fourth amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment,1 5 the exclusionary rule created by Weeks was applied directly to the states.' 6
Thus, the Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio'7 that "all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible in a state
court. "18
In addition to the fourth amendment's protection, section 14, article I of the
Ohio Constitution provides protection for the people as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized.' 9
Although similarities between the two constitutional guarantees cannot be
denied, similarity of scope may not be inferred from similarity of text. As one
commentator has noted, it is "no novel perception that different men may employ
identical language yet intend vastly different meanings and consequences." 20
11. The fourth amendment specifically states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. Not every warrantless search, however, violates the fourth amendment. Five basic exceptions to
the warrant requirement have been judicially created: stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); incident to a lawful
arrest, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); hot
pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); and exigent circumstances, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977). The plain view doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971), permits
the seizure of evidence in plain view during a lawful search based on another crime or purpose. This doctrine, therefore,
is not an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. Id.
14. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
15. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 655.
19. OHIO CoNsr. art. I, § 14.
20. Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972 Foreword The State Constitution: A More Than
"'Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CArat. L. Rrv. 273, 282 (1973).
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Ohio's exclusionary rule is in fact not identical to the federal exclusionary rule
because under Ohio law all evidence seized in an unreasonable search and seizure is
not per se inadmissible. 21 In 1978 the Ohio Supreme Court succinctly stated its
position as follows:
With respect to Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, this court, at a time when
the federal exclusionary rule set forth in Weeks ... was not applicable to the states, held
in State v. Lindivay22 . . .that evidence in a criminal case, even if obtained by unlawful
search, was admissible if relevant and competent.23
Thus, a defendant in Ohio is entitled to the exclusion of some degree under both
constitutions, although the scope of that exclusion need not be identical.
Mapp, and the supremacy clause, 24 guarantee that evidence must be exluded as
a matter of federal law, once a violation of the fourth amendment has been
established. Thus, there is a floor of minimal protection beneath which a state may
not venture without violating the federal constitution. The federal exclusionary rule
would, therefore, exclude evidence that might arguably be admissible in Ohio under
the Lindway standard. Consequently, after Mapp applied the federal exclusionary rule
to the states, the Lindway standard became inoperative in criminal proceedings.
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has specifically noted that while the Ohio
courts have "frequently applied the federal exclusionary rule, the non-exclusionary
rule adopted in Lindway under the Ohio Constitution has never been overruled."25
Thus, Lindway's standard of admissibility must still be recognized as the test for
exclusion of evidence under section 14, article I of the Ohio Constitution.
While the federal constitution undeniably provides a floor of minimal protection
for individual liberties, it does not function as a ceiling on the amount of protection
that a state may provide under its own law. The Supreme Court has specifically
acknowledged that "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal
constitutional standards." 26 Evidence admissible under the federal constitution might
not be admissible under the state constitution. In this same manner, a state might hold
that its exclusionary rule applied to a criminal, or quasi-criminal proceeding, even if
the federal exclusionary rule did not apply. One must remember, however, that "a
State may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional
law. . ,'27 but only as a matter of state constitutional law. Because Burkholder
21. State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 299 U.S. 506
(1936); see also State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St. 3d 281,452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1020(1983); State
v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
22. 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936).
23. City of Cincinnati v. Alexander, 54 Ohio St. 2d 248, 257 n.6, 375 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 n.6 (1978).
24. The supremacy clause states that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Co'.sr. art. Vl, § 2.
25. 54 Ohio St. 2d 248, 257 n.6, 375 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 n.6 (1978).
26. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis in original).
27. Id.
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purports to rely on both the federal and state exclusionary rules, it is crucial to analyze
further the constitutional basis of the decision in order to comprehend its ramifica-
tions.
B. Burkholder's Application of the Exclusionary Rule
The facts of Burkholder indicate that the police acted under the authority of an
invalid search warrant when they seized over one hundred items of stolen property
found at the defendant's residence.2 8 The warrant was invalid because it failed to
recite facts sufficient to establish probable cause. Since the warrant was invalid under
both the state and federal constitutions, the trial court appropriately granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence at trial.29
At the time of his arrest, defendant Burkholder was on probation under the terms
of a suspended sentence for a prior offense. After the evidence was suppressed at
trial, the state attempted to enter the illegally seized evidence in a probation
revocation proceeding against the defendant. The trial court admitted the evidence at
this proceeding on the grounds that the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation
revocation proceedings. 30 Consequently, the defendant's original sentence for the
prior offense was imposed, and he was imprisoned. 31
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and certified the case to the Ohio
Supreme Court to resolve a conflict between this decision and a contrary decision by
another intermediate state court. 32 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals and specifically held as follows:
While the procedural due process requirements in a probation revocation proceeding are
not as extensive as those found in a criminal trial, the substantive constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, must also
apply to a probation revocation proceeding. 33
Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that under both federal and state constitutional
guarantees, illegally seized evidence must be excluded from probation revocation
proceedings.
This holding is not unprecedented, but it is clearly the minority view. Of the
eighteen other states that have considered the issue, fifteen have held that the federal
exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings.3 4 Five of the




32. Id. at 205-06, 466 N.E.2d at 177.
33. Id. at 206, 466 N.E.2d at 178.
34. See 77 A.L.R.3d 636, 641 (1977 & Supp. 1985). See also State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 602-04, 295
S.E.2d 399, 405 (1982). The following states have held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply in probation
revocation proceedings:
Ariz.-State v. Towle, 125 Ariz. 397, 609 P.2d 1097 (Ct. App. 1980).
Ark.-Harris v. State, 606 S.W.2d 93 (Ark. App. 1980).
Cal.-People v. Rafter, 41 Cal. App. 3d 557, 116 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1974).
Colo.-People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448, 541 P.2d 896 (1975).
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seven federal circuit courts of appeals that have considered this issue have agreed
with the majority of the states. 35 Most of these courts have held that a probation
revocation proceeding is not part of a criminal prosecution and that, as Justice
Holmes noted in his dissent in Burkholder, a prospective probationer "is not entitled
to all of the constitutional guarantees available to one who stands charged with a
criminal offense.' '36
While full consideration of the fourth amendment is beyond the scope of this
Comment, one should note that two of the cases relied upon by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Burkholder were overruled, prior to that decision, on the grounds that the
fourth amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence at such proceedings. 3 7
Furthermore, another case cited by the Ohio Supreme Court, Ray v. State,38 clearly
recognizes that the fourth amendment does not require application of the exclusionary
rule in such proceedings. 39 Thus, Ray's conclusion about the federal exclusionary
rule is in direct conflict with the court's conclusion in Burkholder. The internal
inconsistencies within Burkholder only exacerbate the problems created by the
court's reliance on both constitutions.
By denying certiorari in Burkholder,4° the United States Supreme Court
followed its pattern of refusing to consider the fourth amendment's application to
Fla.-Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1976).
Il.-People v. Watson, 69 I11. App. 3d 497, 387 N.E.2d 849 (1979).
Ind.-Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211, 346 N.E.2d 746 (1976).
Me.-State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975).
Mont.-State v. Thorsness, 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692 (1974).
N.H.-Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973).
N.C.-State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 295 S.E.2d 399 (1982).
Or.-State v. Nettles, 287 Or. 131, 597 P.2d 1243 (1979).
Pa.-Commonwealth v. Davis, 234 Pa. Super. 31, 336 A.2d 616 (1975).
R.I.-State v. Spratt, 120 R.I. 192, 386 A.2d 1094 (1978).
\ash.-State v. Proctor, 16 Wash. App. 865, 559 P.2d 1363 (1977).
Only three states have held that the federal exclusionary rule is applicable in such proceedings:
Ga.-Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 219 S.E.2d 28 (1975).
Okla.-Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
Tex.-Moore v. State, 562 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
35. See 30 A.L.R. Fed. 824, 829. The following federal circuit courts of appeals have held that the federal
exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings:
3d Cir.-United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, sub. nom. Mollica v. United
States, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984).
5th Cir.-United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973).
6th Cir.-United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
7th Cir.-United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971).
8th Cir.-United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978).
9th Cir.-United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1975).
Two circuits have held that the exclusionary rule applies in such proceedings:
2d Cir.-United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982).
4th Cir.-United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
36. 12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 208, 466 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1984) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973).
37. See State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 623 P.2d 8 (1980) (overruling State v. Shirley, 117 Ariz. 105, 570 P.2d
1278 (Ct. App. 1977)); State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 295 S.E.2d 399 (1982) (overruling State v. McMilliam, 243
N.C. 775, 92 S.E.2d 205 (1956)). Because these cases were decided two years before Burkholder, there was no reason
for the Ohio Supreme Court to cite these cases as precedent.
38. 387 So. 2d 995 (Fla. App. 1980), petition for review denied, 394 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1981).
39. Id. at 996; see also Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1976).
40. 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
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probation revocation proceedings. 41 Because denial of certiorari is not a decision on
the merits, it remains an open question whether the fourth amendment requires the
exclusion of evidence at probation revocation proceedings. Under Burkholder,
however, it is not clear whether the court's reliance on the state constitution expands
a probationer's right beyond the scope of the fourth amendment.
III. RELIANCE ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES TO EXPAND
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
A. The Current Trend Towards Reliance on State Constitutions
As noted above, a state remains free to expand its own constitutional protections
and "to impose safeguards and protections that exceed those required by the federal
Constitution. "42 Florida adopted this approach in State v. Dodd43 and held that
although the federal exclusionary rule is not applicable, 44 "the Florida constitutional
exclusionary rule... is applicable in probation revocation proceedings."-4 5 In this
manner, Florida reached beyond the limits of the fourth amendment to expand
individual liberties. Such explicit use of state constitutions to go beyond federal
constitutional guarantees has received great attention in recent years. 46
Heralded as the emergence of a "new judicial federalism," 47 the recent trend
toward reliance on state constitutional guarantees has been attributed to the
"[s]tagnation and decline in the protection of constitutional rights by the Supreme
Court .... "48 Justice Brennan recognized that these state constitutional decisions
may reflect "a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court to pull
back from, or at least suspend for the time being, the enforcement ... of the federal
Bill of Rights and the restraints of the due process [clause] .... 49
A good example of this retrenchment is South Dakota v. Opperman,50 in which
the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment does not prohibit the warrantless,
noninvestigatory inventory search of an impounded vehicle. On remand, the state
court held that while the search did not violate the fourth amendment, it did violate
41. See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); United
States v. Rushlow, 385 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 541 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984
(1976).
42. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Hasv. L. Rev. 1324, 1368
(1982) [hereinafter cited as State Constitutional Rights].
43. 419 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1982). See Ray v. State, 387 So. 2d 995 (Fla. App. 1980); see also supra notes 38-39
and accompanying text. Dodd adopted the analysis of Ray prior to Burkholder. Thus, it would have been more appropriate
for the Ohio Supreme Court to cite to this decision by the Florida Supreme Court, rather than to a decision by a lower
appellate court of the same state.
44. See Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1976).
45. 419 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1982).
46. See, e.g., Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HIAsr mms Commsr.
L.Q. 201 (1981); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873
(1976); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980). For a listing
of other sources, see Tarr, Bibliographical Essay, in STATE SUML-,e CoUrss: Pou cYMA.ES m mE FEDERAL SvsTes 206-08
(1982).
47. Porter & Tarr, Introduction, in STATE SuPRE.E Couers: Pouc AEs s mHE FEnet- SysmTE xxii (1982).
48. State Constitutional Rights, supra note 42, at 1331.
49. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 Hnv. L. Rev. 489, 495 (1977).
50. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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the state constitution. 5' Thus, evidence that would have been admissible in a federal
prosecution was not admissible in a state proceeding. Opperman exemplifies the
process of "retroactive incorporation" 5 2 in which a "state court adopts as a matter
of state constitutional law its own earlier federal constitutional interpretation. "s3 The
result is an expansion of individual rights under the state constitution.
Emergence of state courts as the new protectors of individual liberties has
completely reversed the predominant situation of the Warren Court era in
which federal courts championed the protection and expansion of individual
liberties. The former relationship between state and federal courts has been described
as follows:
The federal judiciary, tutored under the liberal activism of the Warren Court, became the
refuge for the individual, especially minorities and politically powerless groups within
society. State courts, reflecting traditional patterns of dominance and dependence, were
considered to be insensitive to the growing demand for a just and more equitable social
order. The Bill of Rights became the instrument by which the Court sought to check state
governmental usurpations and advance social and political egalitarianism. 54
The new activism of state courts has altered this relationship between the two judicial
systems by shifting the focus away from the federal constitution.
It is important to recognize that expansion of state constitutional guarantees will
also create a shift in the advantage of "forum shopping." An individual who has the
opportunity to choose between a state and federal forum may thereby have the
advantage of "constitution shopping." 5 5 If the state courts have expanded individual
liberties, the state forum is more likely to be favorable to the plaintiff asserting an
infringement of an individual liberty because "[flederal courts are not obliged to
vindicate state constitutional provisions which confer greater protection than their
federal counterparts. ' 56 As one commentator has noted:
The [Supreme] Court does not impose upon the lower federal courts a duty to enforce all
state rules governing state officers. If state law condemns a given act, while under the
Supreme Court interpretation the fourteenth amendment has not been violated, a duty to
help enforce that state policy never arises.57
As a result of this policy, the state forum may be considered more advantageous. Once
again, the new federalism has resulted in a reversal of old roles: state courts are
emerging as the most popular forum in which to bring civil liberties and defendants'
rights suits. 5 8 This trend is strongly exemplified in the decisions of state courts in
51. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
52. State Constitutional Rights, supra note 42, at 1389.
53. Id.
54. welsh, Whose Federalism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTts
Co\ST. L.Q. 819, 826 (1983).
55. Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6
Hsm-Gs Co.,sr. L.Q. 975, 989 (1979).
56. Id. at 980.
57. Berman & Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and Seizure-Federal
Problems, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 525, 546 (1960).
58. See generally STATE SSumv.m Cours: PouciAtEms tN im FEvmL. Sis'mui (M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982).
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California, Michigan, New Jersey, and Oregon, where reliance on state constitutional
grounds has become increasingly commonplace.5 9
B. Limitations on the Current Trend
A state court's expansion of individual liberties is valid only under state law.
This policy is closely related to the basis of federalism: each state is completely free
to interpret its own constitution and laws. Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that it has no jurisdiction over cases decided on an "independent and
adequate state ground.' 60 Herb v. Pitcairn6' is often cited to support this doctrine and
explain the Supreme Court's position:
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our
review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.6-
While this autonomy doctrine is clearly recognized by the Supreme Court, the
definitions of independent and adequate state grounds have remained unclear. 63 In
Michigan v. Long,64 the Court recognized that it lacked a consistent approach to
resolution of this problem. 65 Consequently, the Court adopted an unprecedented
presumption of jurisdiction in the absence of a "plain statement'' 66 of adequate and
independent state grounds. Thus, the Court held,
[wihen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal
law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, [the Court] will
accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it
did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. 67
Ohio v. Johnson68 is a good example of the Long presumption in action. The
Court reviewed an Ohio Supreme Court decision which was based on both the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution69 and the
state's double jeopardy prohibition under section 10, article I of the Ohio Constitu-
59. For an analysis of Oregon's reliance on state constitutional grounds, see Linde, supra note 46. For overviews
of state constitutional developments in California, Michigan, and New Jersey, see Howard, supra note 46; State
Constitutional Rights, supra note 42.
60. Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965); see also Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
61. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
62. Id. at 125-26.
63. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); California
v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
64. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
65. Id. at 1038.
66. Id. at 1041.
67. Id. at 1041-42.
68. 467 U.S. 493 (1984); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 n.5 (1984); Three Affiliated Tribes
v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 152-58 (1984).
69. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (applied the double jeopardy
clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
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tion.70 Despite specific references to the state's double jeopardy clause, and to the
state legislature's interpretations of that clause, 71 the Supreme Court held that
"failure to indicate clearly that state double jeopardy protection was being in-
voked," 7 2 coupled with references to decisions under the fifth amendment, indicated
that this decision was based on the fifth amendment. 73 As noted by one commentator,
"Apparently nothing less than an express and unequivocal disclaimer of any reliance
on federal precedents will guarantee the 'nonreviewability' of state court deci-
sions."74
Thus, the Long presumption can act as a limitation on this new trend of reliance
on state constitutions, especially if the state court adopts the "dual reliance"
approach 75 by invoking both the federal and state constitutions to support its decision.
Dual reliance was once thought to block federal judicial review, by invoking the state
constitution, while at the same time reinforcing the state court, by invoking the
federal constitution; 76 this theory is no longer valid under Long. Only a plain and
unequivocal statement of reliance on state law will block federal review. Further-
more, Johnson indicates that reliance upon any federal precedent may cause the Court
to refuse to recognize the state grounds as completely independent.
IV. OHIO'S RELIANCE ON ITS OWN CONSTITUTION
A. The General Trend in Ohio
Unlike the courts of California, New Jersey, Michigan, and Oregon, the Ohio
Supreme Court has not been a leader in the new federalism trend. Professors Mary
Porter and G. Alan Tarr have concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted an
approach directed toward maintaining the status quo and following the leadership of
the United States Supreme Court. 77 Burkholder is arguably a reversal of this
unimaginative approach. However, the ambiguities of Burkholder render any definite
conclusions about its ramifications highly inadvisable.
In three separate cases prior to Burkholder, the Ohio Supreme Court retreated
from an expansion of individual liberties on remand and adopted the position of the
United States Supreme Court in upholding the government's action against the
individual. In Forest City Enterprises v. Eastlake,78 the Ohio Supreme Court on
remand refused to invoke state law to resolve a question on the use of referenda. This
decision ignored the United States Supreme Court's direct reference to the availability
70. Omo CoNsr. art. I, § 10.
71. State v. Johnson, 6 Ohio St. 3d 420, 422, 453 N.E.2d 595, 598 (1983).
72. 467 U.S. 493, 498 n.7 (1984) (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. Welsh, supra note 53, at 850.
75. Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 55, at 996.
76. See id. at 997.
77. Porter & Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 Omo ST.
L.J. 143, 144 (1984).
78. 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976), on remand, 48 Ohio St. 2d 47, 356
N.E.2d 499 (1976) (per curiam).
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of state law.79 Four years later, the United States Supreme Court reversed State v.
Roberts,80 in which the Ohio Supreme Court had originally held that the defendant's
sixth amendment right of confrontation was violated at trial by the admission of
testimony taken at the preliminary hearing from a witness not available at trial.8 '
State v. Madisons2 followed Roberts. In Madison, the Ohio Supreme Court refused
to extend Ohio constitutional law beyond the United States Supreme Court's decision
that the sixth amendment does not require exclusion of this type of evidence. Madison
adopted this analysis despite a strong dissent that argued for increased protection
under the state constitution.8 3 In another case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co.,84 the Ohio Supreme Court refused a direct invitation by the United States
Supreme Court to recognize a special privilege for the press as a matter of state law
beyond the protection provided by the first amendment. 85
All of these cases caused Professors Porter and Tarr to conclude that the new
federalism has not been adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court; this conclusion was
supported by the court's failure to rely on the state constitution, even when invited to
do so by the United States Supreme Court.86 There is, however, one Ohio case that
seemed to break with this acquiescent tradition. Significantly, this anomalous case,
State v. Gallagher,8 7 was specifically mentioned in Burkholder,88 while the cases
discussed above, in which the Ohio Supreme Court declined to expand individual
liberties beyond the scope of the protection offered by the federal constitution, were
not mentioned in Burkholder.
Gallagher dealt with the admissibility of statements given by the defendant to
his parole officer in the absence of proper Miranda8 9 warnings. The Ohio Supreme
Court held that the statements were inadmissible because they were given in violation
of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by both the
federal9° and state constitutions.9 1 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that it could not "be certain that the Ohio court did not construe its constitutional
provision to be identical to that contained in the Fifth Amendment and thus render
judgment simultaneously under both state and federal law." 92 Therefore, the United
States Supreme Court remanded to permit the Ohio Supreme Court to explain whether
its decision relied solely on federal law.
79. See 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
80. 55 Ohio St. 2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978), rev'd, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
81. Id.
82. 64 Ohio St. 2d 322, 415 N.E.2d 272 (1980).
83. Id. at 332-34, 415 N.E.2d at 278-79 (P. Brown, J., dissenting).
84. 54 Ohio St. 2d 286, 376 N.E.2d 582 (1978) (per curiam).
85. See 433 U.S. 562 (1977), rev'g 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976).
86. See Porter & Tarr, supra note 77, at 150-55.
87. 38 Ohio St. 2d 291, 313 N.E.2d 396 (1974), vacated, 425 U.S. 257 (1976), on remand, 46 Ohio St. 2d 225,
348 N.E.2d 336 (1976) (per curiam).
88. 12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 207, 466 N.E.2d 176, 178-79 (1984).
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
91. Omo CoNsr. art. I, § 10.
92. 425 U.S. 257, 259 (1976).
[Vol. 47:221
EXPANDING OHIO'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court held that because its original decision was
based on both constitutions, the court was "independently constrained to the result
[it] reached by the Ohio Constitution. ' 93 While this decision precluded federal
judicial review, 94 the Ohio Supreme Court also stated on remand that the federal
constitution required the same result.95 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court did not profess
to expand the state guarantee beyond the scope of the fifth amendment. The court's
reliance on both constitutions may have been an attempt to maintain the status quo by
remaining acquiescent to federal constitutional law. However, at least arguably, the
court did take an independent stand under the state constitution; reference to the
federal constitution may have been merely superfluous reinforcement of the court's
expansion of individual rights under the state constitution. It is, however, unclear
why the Ohio Supreme Court originally refused to take the initiative and explicitly
state its independent reliance on state grounds.
B. Burkholder's Reliance on the State Constitution
As noted above, Burkholder referred specifically to Gallagher for the proposi-
tion that "a probationer, like the parolee in Gallagher, must be afforded the right to
assert his or her constitutional privileges." 96 The problem with this statement is that
it remains unclear whether the Burkholder court was referring to state constitutional
privileges, federal constitutional privileges, or both. Given the opinion's prior
reference to both constitutions, the logical conclusion is that this oblique reference is
also to both constitutions. The court may also have been signaling, by citing
Gallagher, that the state ground was sufficiently independent to support its decision.
However, this interpretation is far from being unimpeachable given the opinion's
vague reference to Gallagher.
The court in Burkholder went beyond the simple dual reliance of Gallagher
when it unequivocally stated that "pursuant to Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution, evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and
seizure is inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding." 97 This specific
reference was set apart from the court's analysis under the fourth amendment and
indicates that the court did specifically intend to rely on the state constitution for its
decision. Perhaps this unequivocal statement is the Ohio Supreme Court's response
to the Long presumption of reviewability; the United States Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari may indeed indicate that this clear statement of reliance on the state
constitution precluded review by the Supreme Court because it viewed the decision
as resting upon independent and adequate state grounds. 98 However, one should
remember that denial of certiorari is not an adjudication on the merits. The United
93. 46 Ohio St. 2d 225, 228, 348 N.E.2d 336, 338 (1976) (per curiam).
94. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine barring review of state cases
relying on independent and adequate state grounds.
95. 46 Ohio St. 2d 225, 228, 348 N.E.2d 336, 338 (1976) (per curiam).
96. 12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 207, 466 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1984).
97. Id. at 206, 466 N.E.2d at 178.
98. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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States Supreme Court may not have even considered the jurisdictional issue when it
refused to review this case. Therefore, it remains an open question whether
Burkholder relied on independent and adequate state grounds. 99
If Burkholder does not rely on an independent state ground, then a future United
States Supreme Court decision denying applicability of the federal exclusionary rule
in probation revocation proceedings would raise questions as to the continued validity
of Burkholder. If, however, Burkholder is based squarely on state law, then the state
exclusionary rule would apply regardless of the applicability of the federal exclu-
sionary rule. 100 The opinion itself offers little if any guidance as to the intent of the
Ohio Supreme Court. As in Gallagher, the court did not explicitly profess to expand
the individual's rights beyond the protection of the fourth amendment. On remand,
however, the Gallagher court held that its interpretation of the state constitution was
in fact independent of its interpretation of the federal constitution. The problems of
Gallagher's ambiguities, therefore, have reemerged in Burkholder; it remains
uncertain whether the court intended to expand a probationer's rights beyond those
that might be available under the fourth amendment.
Burkholder's unequivocal reference to the state constitution is bolstered by
references to the guarantees of both constitutions. As noted above, dual reliance
complicates the analysis and may defeat even a seemingly plain statement of state
grounds for the decision. Furthermore, Burkholder cited precedent that relied only on
the federal constitution and fourth amendment analysis.'O' While two of the cases
relied on by the Ohio Supreme Court did mention state constitutional grounds,10 2 only
Ray specifically relied on the state constitution in the absence of fourth amendment
protection.' 0 3 Although citation to Ray may support a similar view in Ohio,
Burkholder never explicitly stated that the court intended to provide such protection
in the absence of fourth amendment protection. Thus, one can only speculate that
Burkholder represents an intentional example of the new judicial federalism.
If Burkholder does represent the Ohio Supreme Court's attempt to expand a
probationer's rights under the state constitution, then this may signal a change in the
court's prior acquiescent approach to individual liberties.'°4 If so, Burkholder may be
heralded as the first case to clearly recognize the new judicial federalism in Ohio. At
the very least, Burkholder may indicate that the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the
mandate of Long and attempted to make a plain statement of reliance on state
constitutional grounds. Unfortunately, the court's intentions remain unclear because
of Burkholder's references to both constitutions and to federal constitutional analysis.
99. It should be noted that at least one justice has described Burkholder as "explicitly based on independent state
grounds." California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2072 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. The court's explicit exclusion of evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and seizure
seems to exclude evidence that would be admissible under the Lindway standard of admissibility. If so, Burkholder might
also signal an expansion of the state's exclusionary rule. However, the opinion provides no further guidance on this point.
101. See Adams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 41, 264 S.E.2d 532 (1980); Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d
154 (1979); Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 219 S.E.2d 28 (1975); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1973).
102. See Ray v. State, 387 So. 2d 995 (Fla. App. 1980); Moore v. State, 562 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
103. 387 So. 2d 995, 996-97 (Ha. App. 1980).
104. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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It may be premature, therefore, to claim that Burkholder signals a reversal of Ohio's
acquiescent approach to protection of individual rights.
V. CONCLUSION
While State v. Burkholder held that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in
a probation revocation proceeding, it remains unclear whether the Ohio Supreme
Court intended to expand a probationer's rights beyond those that might be
guaranteed by the fourth amendment. By use of the dual reliance technique, the court
tied its holding to both federal and constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures. This tactic complicates the analysis of Burkholder because it
conflicts with the court's unequivocal reference to state constitutional grounds. Thus,
it remains unclear whether Burkholder signals the Ohio Supreme Court's intention to
expand probationers' rights under the state constitution or to maintain the status quo
through adherence to the limits of the federal constitution. Because of this ambiguity,
Burkholder will remain uncertain if the United States Supreme Court eventually holds
that the federal exclusionary rule is inapplicable in probation revocation proceedings.
If the court actually intended to rely on the state constitution regardless of the
limits of the fourth amendment, an explicit statement to that effect would resolve the
questions raised in this Comment. Furthermore, if Burkholder marks the emergence
of the new judicial federalism in Ohio, then the court would be wise to recognize the
unanswered questions raised by Burkholder and to be more explicit in future cases
that seek to expand individual liberties under the Ohio Constitution.
Kathryn L. Girardat
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